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The structure of the postal sector differs greatly from country to country, even within the EU. However, I wish to address general issues involving regulatory and competition policy in the sector, rather than the details of such interactions within a particular country. Therefore, I will oversimplify the situation and discuss the interactions between regulatory and competition policy in a hypothetical, "typical" postal sector with certain basic market and institutional characteristics.
Characteristics of a Liberalized Postal Sector
(1) The incumbent post is a State Owned Corporation (SOE).
(2) The incumbent post is regulated by a sector specific, postal regulator.
(3) The incumbent post is a dominant firm in at least the letters market.
(4) As a dominant firm, the incumbent will be subject to the competition authorities, especially concerning charges of "abuse of a dominant position." (5) The incumbent's overall rate level is controlled by some form of price cap regulation, at least for markets in which it is dominant.
(6) Despite its overall dominance the incumbent post faces actual or potential competition is at least some of its markets.
(7) Despite the inroads of competition, the incumbent post faces a USO that is at most partially funded.
These characteristics reflect the modal situation in liberalized postal markets, although (with the possible exception of the third), none holds universally. Taken together, these characteristics naturally give rise to the policy issues that are the subject of this paper.
Regulatory and Antitrust Policy Issues
(1) Essential Facilities. What, if any, features of the incumbent's network constitute essential facilities to which the incumbent must grant access to its competitors? Obviously, these issues are highly interrelated. Also, they tend to require the attention of both regulatory and competition authorities. In such situations, there inevitably arise questions about the appropriate "division of labor" between agencies.
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In most countries, the details of this division of labor are just beginning to evolve. 1 In what follows, I shall discuss the considerations that should inform the interactions between regulatory and antitrust policies in each of the areas identified above. A key question is one of redundancy: i.e., Is the role of the antitrust authority merely to guard against "regulatory capture"? Put differently, Would enlightened regulatory policy, in and of itself, ensure that the process of competition was protected in the postal sector?
Access Issues
The ubiquitous network of the incumbent is a tempting target for competitors, entrants, and regulators. A variety of empirical studies have shown that incumbents' delivery networks exhibit significant economies of scale. 2 Yet, they do not exhibit the substantial sunk costs that characterize the "monopoly bottlenecks" of other network industries such as telecommunications and electric power. Thus one would expect there to be somewhat of a gap between a regulatory approach to mandated downstream access and the essential facilities -based criteria of competition authorities.
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From the regulatory point of view, any activity which exhibits economies of scale has the potential to be efficiently shared with competitors. It does not really matter if the productive resource is "impossible or impractical" to reproduce. If the transactions costs from unbundling are sufficiently low, a policy of compulsory access can be used to open significant portions of the value chain to competition. This argument has little connection with the considerations associated with the typical essential facilities deliberation.
It is perhaps possible to reconcile the regulatory and antitrust views of mandated access in a postal sector in which the incumbent has a statutory delivery monopoly for at least some products. In that case, one could take the view that the illegality of replicating the incumbent's network plays the same role as technical impossibility. In such circumstances, a regulatory policy of mandated downstream access at regulated rates has been demonstrated to have a significant impact on increasing upstream competition and overall cost efficiency in the postal sector. 3 However, this harmony begins to be strained once the delivery market is fully opened to competition. In the absence of significant sunk costs, and ample direct and indirect evidence that it is possible for entrant's to create
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Nonetheless, it seems likely that regulators will accede to the requests of end-toend competitors that forced access be granted. The important question, as always, will be determining the terms of such access. Once such terms have been established, the competition authority -even one that had no interest in compelling access itself on essential facilities grounds -should find itself interested in the pricing of access. This is so because the spread between the access price and the retail price affects the ability of "equally efficient" competitors to compete with the incumbent in the market for the upstream component.
To see the issues involved, consider the following example. Supposed a price cap regime is introduced to control the prices of an incumbent that had previously had all its prices directly controlled by the regulator. Suppose also that the price weights are previous period quantities and that the regulator had had the policy of setting downstream access prices (work-sharing discounts) according to the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR). Then, one would expect that, once given freedom to adjust relative prices, the incumbent would likely choose to lower the retail price and increase the access
Prepared for IDEI -La Poste 2008 Conference price. 4 Thus, in order to increase its profits under the price cap regime, the incumbent may choose to adjust its access price (work-sharing discount) in such a way that excludes more efficient providers of the upstream function.
Presumably, this outcome would be of concern to the competition authorities.
That is, even if application of essential facility considerations does not dictate that there must be an upstream market for competition policy reasons, once such a market has been created by regulatory fiat, competition policy criteria would apply. Usually, such potential conflicts can be avoided through adjustments in regulatory policy: e.g., in the present example, one could change the form of the price cap and/or impose the added constraint that work-sharing discounts satisfy ECPR. But, that just reinforces the point that regulatory policies may sometimes conflict with competition policy in this important area.
Arguments for and against mandated unbundled access
In telecommunications, liberalization efforts have included provisions requiring incumbents to sell access to portions of their network on an unbundled basis. What are
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Prepared for IDEI -La Poste 2008 Conference the efficiency reasons for and against granting access to competitors? The unbundling of service offerings by regulated monopolies, combined with the enforced granting of "nondiscriminatory access" has been a cornerstone of regulatory policy since the breakup of AT&T's telecommunications monopoly in the United States. However, this policy tool involves "costs" as well as benefits. My first objective is to explain both sides of the access issue in the context of an overall postal liberalization framework.
Postal service is one of the last of the traditional public infrastructure industries to be opened up to competition. There are always complicated political explanations for such a major shift in public policy. However, from an economist's point of view, the major attraction of liberalization is exposing a monopoly enterprise to the efficiency enhancing pressures of competition. Unfortunately, it is generally recognized that, as is the case for other traditional public utilities, it is not realistic to expect postal markets to become fully competitive as soon as competitive entry is permitted. Thus, during a somewhat lengthy interim period it may be desirable to implement policies designed to promote competition. One such policy is the requirement that a dominant firm provide unbundled access to portions of its productive facilities. It is important to recognize that these types of policies are best viewed as temporary measures that will be abandoned as soon as full competition has established itself. Furthermore, unbundled pricing of various components allows the marketplace to determine where competition will be successful. 5 Unbundling can make it possible for the market to "discover" the socially cost efficient structure for the industry.
These are the potential entry-enhancing advantages associated with a policy of mandated unbundled access. Why does its full force not apply in the postal sector?
While there is no doubt that granting competitors unbundled access may facilitate entry,
in postal markets such entry may not be "socially desirable" in the way that the traditional discussion presumes. That is, it may be precisely cream skimming entry, which undermines socially mandated uniform pricing, that is facilitated by unbundling.
5
Baumol and Sidak (1994) make this point quite eloquently in the context of the telecommunications industry: "Since we cannot be certain which arenas of local telephone service, if any, are natural monopolies, it would be senseless for the regulator to try to determine which arenas have this attribute and to permit entry into only those sectors deemed not to be natural monopolies. Rather, the most rational way to distinguish the arenas into which entry is feasible is to let the market decide. This can be done by opening all local telecommunications to entry, imposing some rules to guard against the erection or perpetuation of artificial barriers to entry, and then observing where entry prospers and where it does not. The former will then be the naturally competitive fields, the latter the natural monopolies."
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A simple example should illustrate this point. Suppose a potential entrant envisions setting up a rival collection and delivery network designed to operate entirely within the a country's major urban (low cost) area. It markets its service as "local mail only," but soon finds that, in order to attract customers; it must offer nationwide delivery.
Therefore it seeks "unbundled access" from the Post, claiming the right to use the Post's nationwide sortation, transportation and delivery networks. Is this the type of entry that proponents of unbundling wish to facilitate? Let us examine the likely practical implications, leaving aside for the moment the crucial question of the price at which such access is to be granted.
Typically, collection and delivery costs are significantly lower in the urban area targeted by the entrant, yet the Post must offer a single, nation-wide rate. In such a situation of socially mandated cross-subsidization, provision of unbundled access only facilitates cream skimming. Cream-skimming by a non-innovate entrant may be profitable even if the entrant to pay the full stamp price for the Post to deliver all of its "out of town" volumes. However, insisting that the entrant's out of town mail be delivered at a discounted rate (and this is what unbundled access amounts to in this context) can only exacerbate the problem.
Granting unbundled access promotes entry, but the entry so promoted may not be socially desirable. Such entry may undermine the ability of the Post to provide universal service at uniform prices.
Unbundling promotes market contestability by reducing the sunk costs of entry
Let me turn next to the argument that unbundling promotes market contestability.
Suppose that important components of postal service prove to be natural monopolies so that substantial competition in their supply would not be socially efficient. In that case, the "market test" appealed to above may be impeded by the exercise of monopoly power.
Also, the effectiveness of potential competition may be impeded in such an arena by the need for any entrant to incur substantial sunk investments before it can hope to compete effectively.
It is certainly true that unbundling can only increase the contestability of a market by reducing the size of the investment necessary for entry and the amount of sunk costs.
Without the need to provide bottleneck facilities, both the total investment costs of entry and the amount that must be irrevocably committed to a particular market can be significantly reduced. Since it is the extent of sunk costs that limits a natural monopoly market's contestability, unbundling clearly increases the degree of market contestability. To my mind there is one important "asset" of the incumbent which does not show up on the books at all, yet is essential to the operation of the incumbent or the success of any entrant: the nationwide system of addresses itself. This numbering system is an organizational asset built up over more than a century. It would neither reasonable nor efficient to expect postal competitors to develop their own addressing system. Although
This is likely to be an important consideration in network industries
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Prepared for IDEI -La Poste 2008 Conference the current system is the cumulative result of substantial the incumbent investments over the years, it is probably impossible to place a separate market value on this asset let alone calculate a fair and efficient access charge for entrants to pay for its use. However, the incumbent undoubtedly incurs expenses involved with maintaining and expanding this system of addresses and the data basis associated with its effective utilization. Because such costs are incurred maintaining the value of what amounts to a public good, they should be included as part of the cost of the Universal Service Obligation borne by the incumbent.
While the nation-wide addressing system is an essential facility, it does not seem practical to directly charge for access to it by entrants. However, the ubiquitous use of that system has given rise to organizational assets of the incumbent, which probably should be regarded as essential facilities. These assets are Post Office box delivery and the Change of Address rerouting system. In many countries, a substantial proportion of addresses are PO boxes maintained by the incumbent (and located in its facilities).
Clearly, a delivery competitor must be able to deliver mail to these PO boxes in order to offer a viable service. Access to these PO boxes should be granted.
It may also be argued that the Change of Address information system should be regarded as an essential facility operated by the incumbent, because it is so thoroughly integrated into the nation-wide addressing system. After all, it hardly seems efficient for
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Change of Address service. Yet, significant costs are imposed on the system by those pieces (and customers) that do utilize this partial service. Therefore, entrants that wish to provide Change of Address service to their customers using the incumbent's information resources should be forced to bear the costs they impose upon the system on an incremental basis. (That is, unlike the nation-wide addressing system itself, it does not seem appropriate to incorporate such costs into the incumbent's overhead.) Presumably, this access would be priced at a mark-up over the incumbent's average incremental cost.
Preventing "Unfair" Competition by SOEs
Competitors continually claim that incumbent posts "compete unfairly."
Sometimes these complaints have obvious merit; e.g., the "mail box monopoly" of the United States Postal Service -a textbook example of raising rivals' costs. More commonly, charges of cross subsidization are thinly disguised attempts to influence the regulatory process to set higher rates for the incumbent's products that are close substitutes for those of the complaining rival. This debate will intensify following liberalization. And, it has the potential to lead to conflicts between regulatory and competition policy objectives.
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True, the end of the letter monopoly will also end critics' most common complaint of this kind: i.e., that the incumbent uses its protected monopoly to obtain the resources to finance "unfair" competition. Yet charges of cross-subsidization will undoubtedly continue. Therefore, price cap regimes are typically extended to include additional provisos that prevent the incumbent from setting the price of any product below its average incremental cost. It is here that the status of the incumbent as a SOE complicates matters.
A profit maximizing firm that has an opportunity to earn at least some profits will not price competitive products below their average incremental cost except as an attempt at predation. It would increase its profits by abandoning that product line altogether.
Predatory pricing by a profit maximizing firm seems unlikely in the postal sector because of the relative ease of entry into the market. This makes it very difficult for a predator to successfully recoup the losses resulting from the below cost pricing required to drive the prey out of the market. However, recent work by Sappington and Sidak (2002) Mathematically, this does not require a major change in the formulation of the usual constrained optimization problem used to model the regulated firm. However, it leads to the possibility of profound changes in the nature of the choices of the firm. Now, it is entirely possible for the firm to wish to adopt prices below marginal costs on a long term, continuing basis: i.e., not as a predatory device with an eye toward raising rates as soon as the prey has exited the market. For the reasons discussed below, regulatory cross subsidy tests are ill-suited to deal with this situation.
8 Things change somewhat under price cap regulation. 9 Sappington and Sidak's formal model assumes that the SOE maximizes a weighted sum of revenue and profits.
There are potentially more serious problems, as well. Because, a revenue maximizing SOE wishes to offer below cost prices on a continuing basis, it may find it optimal to alter its strategic investment policies so as to distort the outcome of any incremental cost test to which its rates may be subject. There are many forms such distortion might take. As very simple example, consider the following: an incumbent wishes to promote its Express Mail service. However, instead of advertising that service explicitly, it decides upon an extensive "corporate image" type advertising campaign.
While not as cost effective as a targeted campaign, such an advertising strategy has one obvious advantage: its costs are truly "joint and common costs." If it had done an Express Mail ad campaign, its costs would be "product specific fixed costs," directly attributable to that product. 10 As such, they would increase the average incremental cost floor pertaining to Express Mail rates. shall briefly summarize each of these arguments.
The appropriate benchmark from which to begin the analysis is an (hypothetical) efficient industry configuration. This is a complicated topic in a multi-product industry.
It has been studied in considerable detail in Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982) . In the context of the case at hand, the relevant question is that of efficient increments to the The answer is straightforward if it can be assumed that the incumbent maximizes its profit and that the X-mail market is competitive. Then, the incumbent would make its diversification decision based upon whether the added revenues it could earn from selling a volume E of X-mail exceeded the added, or incremental cost, of producing that volume. 11 As is discussed more fully below, this incremental cost test is precisely the standard that a social planner would use in evaluating the general desirability of the incumbent's diversification into competitive markets. The reason is quite intuitive.
Ultimately, the key condition for social efficiency is whether or not the volume of service sold in the marketplace is produce at the lowest possible cost. When this volume is produced by two or more firms, productive efficiency requires that the marginal costs of all active firms be equal. Competition ensures that this condition is satisfied for the incumbent's rivals. And, the greatest profits for the incumbent in a competitive market would be obtained by operating at the quantity at which its marginal cost of X-mail also
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Thus, the entry of a profit seeking the incumbent into a competitive related market improves productive efficiency. More than likely, the market price will fall as a result of the additional supply of the incumbent, further benefiting the consumers of X-mail.
12
However, the other firms providing X-mail will not benefit from the incumbent's entry.
Even if the X-mail market were initially perfectly competitive, the largest firms would likely earn significant economic rents: i.e., profits. Not surprisingly, such competitors are vehemently opposed to such market participation by the incumbent and other incumbent postal providers.
The situation becomes even clearer if the X-mail market is not perfectly competitive. Then, the strategic actions of a profit-seeking the incumbent and/or its rivals will undoubtedly result in a lower post entry equilibrium price for X-mail. First, consider the case in which the incumbent enters to "dominate" an existing competitive 12 The only situation in which the incumbent's entry would not result in a lower market price would be the case in which the market price is completely determined by a perfectly elastic competitive supply curve. That is, when there are a large number of actual and potential suppliers willing and able to supply an unlimited quantity at the going price. This is unlikely to be the case in any real world market, but is a useful simplifying assumption in the example below.
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Prepared for IDEI -La Poste 2008 Conference domestic X-mail market. In order to obtain market share (and earn profits), the incumbent must lower the pre-existing market price. To do this, of course, it must be more efficient than the marginal competitive producers. Equally obvious is the fact that such entry would directly benefit consumers and harm competitors. Things are more complicated if the X-mail market is an oligopoly, simply because there is a large range of oligopoly models that might conceivably be used to analyze the situation. However, in the vast majority of cases, the end results of strategic entry by a profit-seeking firm are lower market prices and lower competitor profits.
13
Next, consider the situation in which the incumbent is not a profit-maximizer, but rather pursues some social objective subject to a break-even constraint. It does not particularly matter whether this social objective is Ramsey-Boiteux style total surplus maximization or a more politically salient goal, such as minimizing the uniform stamp price. 14 These cases are easily analyzed because the presence of the break-even
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Prepared for IDEI -La Poste 2008 Conference constraint forces the incumbent to behave to some extent like a profit-maximizer, even if that is not its true objective. Speaking loosely, in this situation, the incumbent earns profits in order to "spend" them in the pursuit of the social objective. This being the case, the incumbent can effectively pursue its social objective if and only if it actively pursues profitable diversification opportunities. As above, the results are lower prices for consumers and lower profits for competitors in the competitive markets. Now, however, the profits earned by the incumbent in the competitive markets do not go to its bottom line, but rather toward the ability to charge lower prices in its monopoly markets, in furtherance of its social objective.
The message should be clear: diversification by a profit-seeking or socially motivated, profit-constrained incumbent results in lower prices for consumers and lower profits for its competitors. Thus it is hardly surprising that competitors routinely and vociferously oppose such diversification by the incumbent and similarly situated monopolies.
As Sappington and Sidak (2002) point out, the situation changes when the SOE is assumed to maximize revenues rather than profits or consumers' surplus. The gist of their argument can be summarized as follows:
(a) the public firm (e.g., the incumbent) is interested in maximizing revenue subject to a break-even constraint;
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(c) incremental cost tests may be ineffective in preventing such entry; because (d) the public firm may, ex ante, choose to employ production technologies with high common costs relative to product specific fixed costs in order to be able to pass any incremental cost test, ex post.
To illustrate this argument, suppose that the incumbent's network costs $780 million and provides service for 100 million units of ordinary letter mail. It also has the capacity to provide up to 60 million units of X mail at a marginal (variable) cost of $3 per unit. However, suppose that, at the time it was configuring its network, the incumbent had another option: it could have developed a network capable of serving 100 million units of ordinary mail at a cost of only $600 million, but that network could not be utilized to provide X-mail service. The only way the incumbent could participate in that market would be by setting up a separate operation which would allow it to provide service at a unit cost of $6.
15
If the management of the incumbent were interested in selling ordinary mail at the lowest price consistent with covering its costs, it would choose to operate the less costly network, which would allow it to provide ordinary letter mail service at a price equal to its unit cost of $6. However, if the management of the incumbent seeks instead to maximize its total revenues subject to a break-even constraint, it would choose the more
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One might object that, if (constrained) revenue maximization were the objective of the incumbent management, what would prevent the incumbent from adopting the more efficient network. When the X-mail market came into existence, it could take over all of that market by setting a price of (slightly below) $4. It could offset its X-mail losses of $200 million by raising the price of ordinary mail by $2 (to $8). In that case, the incumbent's total revenues and total costs would both be $1,200 million so that it would just break-even, as required. This strategy would allow the company to earn more revenues than the expansion strategy discussed above, in which the incumbent and UPX shared the X-mail market. Recall that, in that case, the incumbent provided 60 million units of X-mail service at a price of $5 and 100 million units of ordinary mail service at a price of $6.6. This would yield it total revenues of only $960 million. If maximizing revenues were the objective of the incumbent management, why would it choose the "expensive network" strategy?
Here is where the Sappington and Sidak analysis becomes quite subtle. Their answer is that the incumbent management would choose the expensive network strategy because it anticipated that it would be subject to an incremental cost test should it ever
Prepared for IDEI -La Poste 2008 Conference wish to the X-mail market, or similar related market. The economies of scope built into the expensive network would enable the incumbent to pass the incremental cost test imposed at the time of its X-mail entry, thereby enabling it to pursue its revenue maximization strategy without interference. Therefore, Sappington and Sidak would argue, public firms such as the incumbent should not be allowed to participate in unregulated markets even if their participation can satisfied an incremental cost test at the time of the proposed entry.
Universal Service: a "burdensome" obligation or an "unfair" competitive advantage?
There is, as yet, no settled methodology for measuring the costs of an incumbent post's USO. 16 Indeed, there are some who argue that the ubiquity of the incumbent's network is a competitive advantage rather than a burdensome obligation. Liberalization will undoubtedly shed light on this question. However, regulatory policies designed to compensate the incumbent for its USO may well generate competition policy concerns.
A simple example will serve to illustrate this point.
Consider an incumbent serving a high cost delivery area to which it delivers letter mail (in which it is market-dominant) and X Mail, a competitive product. Assume that
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However, due to economies of scope, without its letter mail network, the incumbent's unit cost of X mail would be 6. Assume also that there are 100 units of letter mail and 100 units of X mail addressed to the area each period and that the uniform stamp price is 7. Finally, suppose that the competitive X mail sector would be willing to supply that service at a price of is 4.
Clearly, some compensation would be required to induce the incumbent to continue its operations in the area. I will not go into detail here, regarding how much compensation should be paid. However, it should be equally clear that any payment that enabled the incumbent to profitably serve the area would bring howls of protest from its X mail competitors. 17 How would the antitrust authorities respond to the challenge that "but for" the USO subsidy, the incumbent could not successfully compete in the market for X mail addressed to this area? (Never mind for the moment that it is socially efficient
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Nor can the issue necessarily be resolved by introducing competition "for the market" into the USO funding process. Suppose that the 1000 in fixed costs associated with the local delivery network represent the incumbent's true incremental fixed costs for serving the area given that it also serves several neighboring (profitable) areas. Suppose that if, instead, one calculated the incumbent's stand alone fixed costs for serving the area the figure would be 1500. Finally, assume that the local newspaper delivery firm could replicate the incumbent's network with stand alone fixed costs of 1200. In that case, one would not expect the newspaper firm to "out bid" the incumbent in any competition for the USO market. The incumbent would win, not because of its absolute efficiency, but because of its economies of scope.
Thus it is not surprising that competitors view economies of scope as a threat to competition, rather than a source of efficiency. 18 However, it would appear that the only resolution to this problem would be to prohibit the incumbent from serving any non dominant markets, regardless of the scope economies that would be forgone. telecommunications or electricity. 21 Others have argued that requiring incumbents to grant downstream assess is essential for the development of significant competition, at least in the short to medium run. I will not try to resolve this question here. However, all parties to the debate seem to agree that entrants must be granted access to the incumbent's PO Box subscribers. In some jurisdictions, such access is a matter for "commercial negotiations" between the incumbent and potential entrants. In others, the rate is set by the postal regulator directly or indirectly (should negotiations break down).
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However, there remains considerable debate over the appropriate pricing methodology.
Incumbent posts tend to argue that the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR)
is the appropriate methodology to use for access pricing. Regulatory commissions tend to argue that the appropriate standard should be cost-based: i.e., "bill and keep" when the It turns out that this debate ignores an important aspect of the market for PO Box services and postal markets generally: they are 2-sided markets. As the emerging literature on this topic has indicated, simple cost-based rules rarely suffice to characterize either desirable or equilibrium characteristics of the marketplace. 22 Therefore, before it is possible to truly understand access pricing for PO Boxes, it is necessary to understand the benchmark pricing outcomes under competition, monopoly and welfare maximization.
Market definitions issues:
As usual, the market definition exercise involves determination of both relevant product or services markets and relevant geographic markets. For present purposes, I
will focus on two retail markets for postal services, one wholesale (or service component 
The retail market for street addressed mail
A local competitor provides end-to-end service in this market, entirely bypassing the incumbent's network. Nothing the incumbent does in the access market will have any direct effect on competition in this market. Nonetheless, there is an important interrelationship between the market for PO Box services and the associated wholesale market involving collection, sortation, and partial delivery. In order for an entrant to
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Prepared for IDEI -La Poste 2008 Conference successfully compete in this wholesale market, it must be granted access to the incumbent's PO Box addresses. Similarly, the connection between this wholesale market and the retail market for street addressed mail in the same region is also very close. It is difficult (but not impossible) to envision an entrant competing successfully in the market for street addressed mail without being granted access to the incumbent's PO Box addresses. However, as long as access is granted at some price, entrants have shown that they can limit the impact on their ability to compete in the street addressed mail market by passing through some portion of the PB access charge by charging a high price for PB addressed mail.
One might argue that, by forcing entrants to charge different prices for street addressed and PB addressed mail, the incumbent is "raising its rivals' transaction costs."
There may be something to this, but I treat this as a "second order" for present purposes.
The retail market for PB addressed mail
As long as the incumbent has an overwhelming dominance in the market for PO Box service, its dominance in end-to-end provision of service for PB addressed mail is largely a matter of definition. In any event, competition in this market cannot be significantly impacted by PB access pricing.
The wholesale market for PB addressed mail
This situation is where the ECPR methodology is traditionally applied. As long as ECPR principles are followed, no equally efficient competitor will be excluded from this market by a PB access price above cost. Therefore, it seems that the ability of the incumbent to charge ECPR access prices for PO Box addressed mail has the effect of limiting the inefficient bypass of its local delivery network to street addressed mail. This does not exclude an equally efficient competitor from the delivery market for PO Box addressed mail. Rather, it prevents the expansion of an arguably less efficient competitor into that market as well.
Analysis of alternative counterfactual benchmarks
The above discussion indicates that if one believes that the incumbent's PO Box firms charge mailers a monopoly rate and compete away the profits by offering low prices to PO Box customers.
24
My analysis has revealed that the market for PO Boxes is exhibits many of the now classic characteristics of 2-sided markets. This means that care must be taken before applying the standards of traditional competition policy when evaluating the pricing of access to this essential facility. 25 In particular, an access price well in excess of the marginal cost of access does not constitute prime facie evidence of either "abuse of dominance," or an attempt at "leveraging monopoly power." Nor does it necessarily signal a lack of competition in the PO Box market itself.
24 See Armstrong and Wright (2004) . 25 For a discussion of the necessary caveats, see Wright (2004) DRAFT -Preliminary and Incomplete
Prepared for IDEI -La Poste 2008 Conference
The paper has analyzed the importance of each of the above characteristics (and their interrelationships) on the formulation of regulatory and antitrust policies in the postal sector.
